Knowledge-based Security Policies

Joint work with Piotr Mardziel, Michael Hicks, and Mudhakar Srivatsa

Preserving Privacy



CHEQUING ACCOUNT STATEMENT Page : 1 of 1

JOHN JONES 1643 DUNDAS ST W APT 27 TORONTO ON M6K 1V2


Statement period	Account No.
2003-10-09 to 2003-11-08	00005-
	123-456-7


Date	Description	Ref.	Withdrawals	Deposits	Balance
2003-10-08	Previous balance				0.55
2003-10-14	Payroll Deposit - HOTEL			694.81	695.36
2003-10-14	Web Bill Payment - MASTERCARD	9685	200.00		495.36
2003-10-16	ATM Withdrawal - INTERAC	3990	21.25		474.11
2003-10-16	Fees - Interac		1.50		472.61
2003-10-20	Interac Purchase - ELECTRONICS	1975	2.99		469.62
2003-10-21	Web Bill Payment - AMEX	3314	300.00		169.62
2003-10-22	ATM Withdrawal - FIRST BANK	0064	100.00		69.62
2003-10-23	Interac Purchase - SUPERMARKET	1559	29.08		40.54
2003-10-24	Interac Refund - ELECTRONICS	1975		2.99	43.53
2003-10-27	Telephone Bill Payment - VISA	2475	6.77		36.76
2003-10-28	Payroll Deposit - HOTEL			694.81	731.57
2003-10-30	Web Funds Transfer - From SAVINGS	2620		50.00	781.57
2003-11-03	Pre-Auth. Payment - INSURANCE		33.55		748.02
2003-11-03	Cheque No 409		100.00		648.02
2003-11-06	Mortgage Payment		710.49		-62.47
2003-11-07	Fees - Overdraft		5.00		-67.47
2003-11-08	Fees - Monthly		5.00		-72.47
	*** Totals ***		1,515.63	1,442.61	

Approach 1: Deny Access

FIRST BANK OF WIKI 1425 JAMES ST, PO BOX 4000 CHEQUING ACCOUNT STATEMENT VICTORIA BC V8X 3X4 1-800-555-5555 Page: 1 of 1 Account No. nt period JOHN JON 00005b 2003-11-08 1643 DUNE 123-456-7 TORONTO Date Deposits Balance 2003-10-08 Previous 0.55 2003-10-14 Payroll D 694.81 695.36 2003-10-14 Web Bill F 495.36 474.11 2003-10-16 ATM With 2003-10-16 Fees - Inte 472.61 2003-10-20 469.62 Interac Pu 2003-10-21 Web Bill P 169.62 2003-10-22 ATM Withd 69.62 2003-10-23 Interac Pur ĺΒ 40.54 2003-10-24 Interac Ref 2.99 43.53 2003-10-27 Telephone 36.76 694.81 2003-10-28 Payroll Dep 731.57 2003-10-30 Web Funds 50.00 781.57 2003-11-03 Pre-Auth. Pa 55 748.02 2003-11-03 Cheque No. 00 648.02 710.49 2003-11-06 Mortgage Payr -62.47 2003-11-07 Fees - Overdraf 5.00 -67.47 2003-11-08 Fees - Monthly 5.00 -72.47 *** Totals *** 1.515.63 1,442.61


Approach 2: Redaction






Knowledge-Based Policy

- Cannot know exact dollar amount of any transaction with greater than 0.01% certainty.
 - Implies range of at least \$100 (10k values)
- Cannot know exact balance amount with greater than 0.005% certainty.
 - Range of at least \$200
- Also permits non-contiguous uncertainty
 - Balance \$1,000 \$1,050 with 50% probability
 - Balance \$1,100 \$1,150 with 40% probability
 - Balance \$1,150 \$1,175 with 10% probability



Approach 3: Blurring



Question:


Are there any withdrawals over \$500?


Can't answer this...


Goal: Answer as many questions as possible, while ensuring privacy bounds hold.


New Approach


- No a priori blurring or redaction
- Instead, selectively answer outside queries
 - Keep track of outsiders' knowledge
 - If answering query would reveal too much, don't answer
 - Otherwise, answer query and calculate the change in knowledge
- Always enforce knowledge-based policy
 - Cannot know exact dollar amount of any transaction with greater than 0.01% certainty.
 - Cannot know exact balance amount with greater than 0.005% certainty.






















Modeling Knowledge



















Problem: Rejection could reveal information

Solution: Check that constraints are not violated *for any possible secret.*





So Far...

- Mechanism for representing knowledge
 - Probability Distributions¹
- Method for ensuring rejection does not leak information.
 - Check privacy for **all** possible secrets.
- One more issue... Efficiency!

¹ Clarkson, Myers, Schneider. "Quantifying Information Flow with Beliefs," Journal of Computer Security, 2009.


Problem For large state spaces, and complex sequences of queries precise tracking is impractical.


Birthday Query


Birthday (bday) $\in [0, 365]$


Birth Year (byear) ∈ [1906, 2011]


```
today := 260
if bday ≥ today ∧ bday < (today + 7) then
    output := True;
else
    output := False;</pre>
```




















































Soundness Theorem


If evaluation using our approach indicates the query does not reveal too much...


Then the query is safe.


No amount of computation on an attacker's part can provide certainty above the threshold.

















Summary

- Control Information Flow By Focusing on Queries
- No need to introduce noise (querier gets precise results)
- Sound, efficient abstraction for probability distributions
 - Tracks bounds on outsiders' beliefs
- Future work
 - Non-linear assignments
 - Non-integer values (in particular: lists)