MULTI-AGENT SYSTEM FOR DETECTING FALSE DATA INJECTION ATTACKS AGAINST

THE POWER GRID

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1. MOTIVATION


- In the power grid, control decisions and subsequent actions that directly impact the operation of the power grid are made based on estimation data obtained from the state estimator.
- False Data Injection (FDI) attacks are cyber attacks that target measurement data used for state estimation.
- FDI attacks modify sensor readings obtained from measuring equipment with the aim of misleading the control center.

2. CHALLENGES

- Substations have access to a limited amount of information to accurately determine state.
- Determining states for substations locally introduces singularities in power flow computation.
- Deploying agents across the network requires developing new functional relationships among substations to determine power flow.
- An attacker who knows the topology of the power grid can craft an attack that bypasses existing bad data detection schemes.
- We propose a multi-agent system for accurate and timely detection of FDI attacks.
- Soft-ware implemented agents are distributed across substations to
 - ✓ facilitate exchange of measurement data and state variables among substations
 - ✓ detect disparities between state variables at the substation and whole grid state variables.
 - \checkmark ensure scalability of the solution.


4. MULTI-AGENT SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE

- Software based agents are created for each substation.
- Each agent collects measurements from its substation, shares this data with other agents and the control center periodically.
- Using Shared measurements, agents can
 - ✓ build subsystems of the power grid,
 - ✓ determine state estimates at these subsystems
 - ✓ Identify discrepancies in state estimate results



 New functional relationships developed need to be mapped onto the entire power network.

3. CYBER STRUCTURE OF THE POWER GRID





Procedure: generate sub-system for agent at bus *i*

- (1) Include bus *i* and its neighboring buses;
- (2) Include the transmission lines that connect the buses selected at (1);
- (3) Keep unchanged the real power flow measurements at the sending and receiving end of selected transmission lines;
- (4) **For** bus *j* ≠ *i*

EndFor

- (5) **For** transmission line *k* not selected at (2)
- (6) **If** Power *P* at line *k* is delivered into bus *j*
- (7) Increase power injection at bus *j* by *P*





Else
Decrease power injection at bus <i>j</i> by <i>P</i>
EndIf

EndFor

5. FORMAL ANALYSIS

- Threat Model: For a power network, the correlation between the measurement vector z and the state estimate x is given by z = Hx + e where H is the topology matrix.
- Attackers compromise measurements delivered to the control center by injecting an FDI attack vector a such that $z_a = Hx + e + a$.
- The FDI attack is designed to bypass bad data detection for the whole power grid. In addition Measurement data exchanged by substations can be compromised.
- Detection: The FDI attack is undetectable if there is a vector c such that a-Hc=0. For a substation, the agent A_i computes a measurement vector z'_i and state vector x'_i from $z'_i = H'_i x'_i + e'_i$
- The FDI attack must satisfy the condition $a' = H'_i c'_i$ at each substation along with a = Hc to remain undetectable.

6. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION

• The figures below show the distribution of agents for a 9-bus system.


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
(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)







Injection: Inject false data *a* into the system by selecting an arbitrary vector *c* = [0 - 1 2 0 0 0 0 0]^T
Computing *a* = *Hc*, and *a'* = *H'_ic'_i*, conditions for FDI are tested. For some agents (4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9), this condition does not hold making the attack detectable by our proposed agent-based detection technique.

• The attack is detected if the condition $a' = H'_i c'_i$ is not satisfied for at least on agent.


7. FUTURE WORK

- Enhancing this technique to identify compromised measurements
- Evaluate the approach with a physical system





one agent.



Probability that an agent successfully detects an FDI for the 9-bus, 14-bus and 30-bus system

8. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This material is based upon work supported by the Maryland Procurement Office under Contract No. H98230-14-C-0141.

HoTSoS Symposium and Bootcamp HOT TOPICS in the SCIENCE OF SECURITY APRIL 4-5, 2017 | HANOVER, MARYLAND