Exploiting DRAM Bank Mapping and HugePages for Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks on Shared Cache in Multicore

Michael Bechtel is a Computer Science Ph.D. student at the University of Kansas. His current research interests include embedded real-time systems, microarchitectural security and machine learning applications.

An Uncertain Graph-based Approach for Cyber-security Risk Assessment

Hoang Hai Nguyen (Frank) is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC). He also holds a research assistantship at the Coordinated Science Laboratory, UIUC, under the direction of professor David M. Nicol.

Do Configuration Management Tools Make Systems More Secure? An Empirical Research Plan

Md Rayhanur Rahman has started his Ph.D. program in the department of Computer Science at North Carolina State University. His research interest is in the area of Software Engineering and Software Security. He works under the supervision of Dr. Laurie Williams.

Application of the Armament Cyber Assessment Framework

Submitted by Anonymous on

 

Aidan McCarthy is a senior at the United States Military Academy from Lexington, Massachusetts. He is majoring in Computer Science with a focus in cybersecurity. He is an OSCP and leads the Cadet Competitive Cyber Team. After graduation, Aidan will commission as an officer in the United States Army Cyber Corps. 

 

 

 

Tokens Of Interaction: Psycho-physiological Signals, A Potential Source of Evidence of Digital Incidents


Nancy Mogire is a PhD candidate at UH Manoa’s information and computer sciences department, affiliated with the Hawaii Interdisciplinary Neurobehavioral & Technology Lab(HINTLab) and the Adaptive Security and Economics Lab(ASECOLab).

@PAD: Adversarial Training of Power Systems Against Denial of Service Attacks

In this work, we study the vulnerabilities of protection systems that can detect cyber-attacks in power grid systems. We show that machine learning-based discriminators are not resilient against Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. In particular, we demonstrate that an adversarial actor can launch DoS attacks on specific sensors, render their measurements useless and cause the attack detector to classify a more sophisticated cyber-attack as a normal event.
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