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This is the site of the Science of Security Virtual Organization.
This is the site of the Science of Security Virtual Organization.
This event provides attendees with an opportunity to hear firsthand about the work of TRUST faculty and students-specifically activities that:
The SoS Virtual Organization design will be reviewed with government sponsors of security research.
The Science of Security (SoS) Lablet is housed in the Information Trust Institute at Illinois. It is contributing broadly to the development of security science while leveraging Illinois expertise in resiliency, which in this context means a system's demonstrable ability to maintain security properties even during ongoing cyber attacks.
Review the results from the first SaTC ONLINE Cyber Café, designed to identify critical issues in cybersecurity and encourage collaborative research between computer science and the social sciences. See this link for more information.
Secure software depends upon the ability of software developers to respond to security risks early in the software development process. Despite a wealth of security requirements, often called security controls, there is a shortfall in the adoption and implementation of these requirements. This shortfall is due to the extensive expertise and higher level cognitive skillsets required to comprehend, decompose and reassemble security requirements concepts in the context of an emerging system design. To address this shortfall, we propose to develop two empirical methods: (1) a method to derive security requirements patterns from requirements catalogues using expert knowledge; and (2) a method to empirically evaluate these patterns for their "usability" by novice software developers against a set of common problem descriptions, including the developer's ability to formulate problems, select and instantiate patterns. The study results will yield a framework for discovering and evaluation security requirements patterns and new scientific knowledge about the limitations of patterns-based approaches when applied by novice software developers.
Hard Problem:
Security requirements are difficult to apply in design and must incorporate system architecture, functional requirements, security policies, regulations, and standards.
PI(s):Travis Breaux, Laurie Williams, Jianwei Niu
Dr. Breaux is the Director of the CMU Requirements Engineering Lab, where his research program investigates how to specify and design software to comply with policy and law in a trustworthy, reliable manner. His work historically concerned the empirical extraction of legal requirements from policies and law, and has recently studied how to use formal specifications to reason about privacy policy compliance, how to measure and reason over ambiguous and vague policies, and how security and privacy experts and novices estimate the risk of system designs.
To learn more, read about his ongoing research projects or contact him.
Mobile applications are a critical emerging segment of the software industry, and security for web-based mobile applications is of increasing concern. We hypothesize that many of the most important security vulnerabilities in web-based mobile applications are a consequence of expressing programs at a low level of abstraction, in which important security properties are implicit and only indirectly related to code. In order to test this hypothesis, we are building a system for expressing web-based mobile applications at a higher level of abstraction, in which security properties are made explicit through expressions of design intent, and in which those properties are more directly related to code. We will evaluate whether such an approach can reduce or eliminate the most common vulnerabilities of web-based mobile software, while imposing a low or even negative marginal cost on developers.
Jonathan Aldrich is a Professor of Computer Science and Software Engineering at Carnegie Mellon University, where he directs the Master of Software Engineering program. He is the coauthor (with Michael Scott) of the textbook Programming Language Pragmatics, 5th edition. His research combines programming languages, software engineering, and human-computer interaction to explore how the way we express software affects our ability to engineer software at scale. A particular theme of much of his work is improving software quality and programmer productivity through better ways to express structural and behavioral aspects of software design within source code.
Aldrich has contributed to ownership, typestate checking, modular and gradual verification techniques, and usability in programming language and type system design. For his work specifying and verifying architecture, he received a 2006 NSF CAREER award, the 2007 Dahl-Nygaard Junior Prize, and an ICSE test of time award. Outside the university, he serves on ACM Council and was the CTO of Noteful, a startup delivering an educational app for music theory and note reading.